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Of Historiography and
Constitutional Principle: Jefferson’s
Reply to the Danbury Baptists
Ian Bartrum
Before I built a wall I’d ask to know,
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence,
Something there is that doesn’t love a wall.
—Robert Frost1
In June of 1998 the Library of Congress opened Religion and the
Founding of the American Republic, a retrospective that assembled
a diverse array of historical materials and attempted to impose
some narrative order on the complex strands of theology, persecu-
tion, and politics that entwined during our nation’s formative
years.2 As centerpiece of the display stood the restored first draft
of a letter Thomas Jefferson wrote in reply to a committee of
Baptists in Danbury, Connecticut, in which he invoked the now-
canonical metaphor of a “wall of separation between church and
state.”3 With the help of an FBI forensics team, Manuscript Division
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1. Robert Frost, “Mending Wall,” in The Poetry of Robert Frost, ed. Edward
C. Latham (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1979), 33.
2. “Faith of our Forefathers: Religion and the Founding of the American Repub-
lic,” Library of Congress Information Bulletin 56 (May 1998), 112.
3. Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephram Robbins, and
Stephen S. Nelson, a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association in the
State of Connecticut (January 1, 1802); reprinted in Jefferson: Political Writings,
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Chief James Hutson was able to reveal, for the first time, several
lines of text that Jefferson had blacked out of his original draft.
Hutson also provided a short commentary on the relevance of the
new material to our understanding of Jefferson’s disestablishment
principles and motivations. Rather than support the conventional
treatment of the document as a statement of enduring consti-
tutional meaning, Hutson suggested that the redacted lines—
which evince careful consideration of the letter’s political impli-
cations4—expose Jefferson’s intent to deliver “a partisan counter-
punch, aimed below the belt at enemies who were tormenting him
more than a decade after the First Amendment was composed.”5
While he acknowledged that Jefferson viewed the letter partially
as an opportunity to reemphasize the commitment to religious
liberty he had demonstrated fifteen years earlier when he drafted
Virginia’s Statute Establishing Religious Freedom, Hutson main-
tained that the letter’s “principal purpose” was political, and
pointed out that Jefferson actually attended religious services con-
ducted in the House of Representatives just two days after compos-
ing it.6 More provocatively, he suggested that some of Jefferson’s
revisions—such as striking out the word “eternal” before “wall of
separation,” and omitting a characterization of his office as
“merely temporal”—might reflect an increasingly sympathetic
view of public religion:
It seems likely that . . . Jefferson was motivated not merely by political
considerations but by a realization that these words, written in haste to
make a political statement, did not accurately reflect the conviction he
had reached by the beginning of 1802 on the role of government in reli-
gion. . . . [H]e seems to have come around to something close to the
views of New England Baptist leaders such as Isaac Backus and Caleb
Blood, who believed that, provided that the state kept within its well-
appointed limits, it could provide “friendly aids” to churches, including
putting at their disposal public property.7
ed. Joyce Appelby & Terence Ball (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 396–97
[hereinafter “Danbury Letter”].
4. James Hutson, “A ‘Wall of Separation’: FBI Helps Restore Jefferson’s Obliter-
ated Draft,” Library of Congress Information Bulletin 57 (June 1998): 136, 138.
On the advice of Attorney General Levi Lincoln (of Massachusetts), Jefferson
omitted inflammatory language directed at New England Federalist opponents
who had used his unwillingness to recognize official days of thanksgiving and
prayer to smear him as an Atheist. In the redacted text Jefferson implicitly
linked such practices with the hated English monarchy: “[As] Congress [is] inhib-
ited from acts respecting religion, and the Executive authorized only to execute
their acts, I have refrained from prescribing even those occasional performances
of devotion, practiced by the Executive of another nation as the legal head of its
church.” Ibid., 139.
5. Ibid., 139.
6. Ibid., 163.
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In short, Hutson suggested that the restorations expose a wall of
separation that is more a figure of political rhetoric than a state-
ment of constitutional principle, and reveal a Jefferson who was
ultimately more open and less ruthlessly enlightened than the tra-
ditional narrative supposes.
The exhibition and commentary provoked an immediate academic
backlash, which seemed to catch Hutson somewhat by surprise.8 At
the urging of a church–state watchdog group, Professors Robert
O’Neill and Robert Alley—with twenty-two other academics signa-
tories—sent a response letter to the Library of Congress complain-
ing that Hutson had presented “an unbalanced treatment of
[Jefferson’s letter] on the basis of questionable analysis that has
not, as far as is known, been subjected to independent scholarly
review.”9 Hutson elaborated on his conclusions in a book published
shortly thereafter, but his essential message remained the same: we
should understand Jefferson’s “wall of separation” primarily as pol-
itical rhetoric, and “there is no evidence that Jefferson considered
the metaphor the quintessential symbolic expression of his church-
state views.”10 Hutson’s critics remained unpersuaded, however,
and the controversy generated enough academic interest that the
7. Ibid., 139, 163.
8. See Laurie Goodstein, “Fresh Debate on 1802 Jefferson Letter,” New York
Times, September 10, 1998, A20, c.1.
9. The Library of Congress Misinterprets Thomas Jefferson: A Letter of Concern
from the Scholars Listed Below (July 28, 1998), available online at: http://
librimagni.com/~blaine/jeff2.html. Other notable signatories included:
William Van Alstyne, Robert Drinan, Norman Dorsen, Ronald Flowers, Edwin
Gaustad, Peter Irons, Isaac Kramnick, and R. Laurence Moore. Apparently, the
activist group “Americans United for the Separation of Church and State” orche-
strated the letter and issued a simultaneous press release. See Leading Church-
State Scholars Refute Library of Congress’ Views On Thomas Jefferson and
Church-State Separation, Americans United Press Release (July 1998) available
online at: http:// www.au.org/ site/News2?abbr¼pr&page¼NewsArticle&id¼
6127&news_iv_ctrl¼1507.
10. James H. Hutson, Religion and the Founding of the American Republic
(Washington, DC: Library of Congresss, 1998), 84. In one notable elaboration,
Hutson suggested that, to the extent Jefferson thought that hismetaphorencapsu-
lated a constitutional principle, it was most likely a “jurisdictional” or federalist
one: that the federal Congressmust not interferewith state or local religious insti-
tutions. Ibid. This “federalist” interpretation finds support in what appears to be
Jefferson’s deliberate mark of emphasis within the phrase “I contemplate with
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that
their legislature should make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”
See Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen
S.Nelson,ACommittee of theDanburyBaptistsAssociation in the StateofConnec-
ticut, January 1, 1802, (handwrittendraft); reprinted in JamesH.Hutson, “Thomas
Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists: A Controversy Rejoined,” William &
Mary Quarterly 56 (October 1999): 775, 778 (underline in original).
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William and Mary Quarterly invited several of the principal players
to participate in a topical forum in the fourth issue of its 1999
volume.
Hutson opened the forum with a longer explanation of his views,
this time equipped with the full complement of an “appropriate
scholarly apparatus.”11 He reiterated in greater detail his thoughts
on the letter’s political purpose, and then went into more depth
regarding his claims about Jefferson’s evolving acceptance of reli-
gious activities on or within federal properties.12 The other forum
participants then took turns challenging or supporting Hutson’s
conclusions. The first challenge came from Robert O’Neill,
co-drafter of the original response letter, who downplayed Jeffer-
son’s “seeming softness on sectarian use of government buildings”
as uncharacteristic of his broader views on disestablishment, and
claimed that Hutson’s restorations “alter the meaning or import
of the letter in no substantial way.”13 Thomas Buckley, however,
argued that the restorations make up part of a fuller picture of Jef-
ferson as a political, and a religious, man. Buckley urged an under-
standing of the letter and its author consistent with the time and
circumstance, suggesting that “to treat Jefferson as a herald of
twentieth-century secularism is to read him dogmatically and
falsely.”14 He concluded with a biting observation: “Toward the
end of his presidency, reflecting on the ‘slander’ he had suffered
in the 1800 campaign, Jefferson vigorously denied that he had
ever intended to foster a ‘government without religion. . . . How
ironic that scholars today who claim Jefferson’s mantle should
embrace his political foes’ perspective.”15 Edwin Gaustad and
Daniel Dreisbach then took turns on either side of the issue—the
former opining that “[r]einforcing the wall between church
and state remained [Jefferson’s] lifelong objective,”16 and the
11. James H. Hutson, “Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists: A
Controversy Rejoined,” William & Mary Quarterly 56 (1999): 775, 777.
12. Ibid., 787–90. In support of the latter contention, Hutson pointed to Jeffer-
son’s repeated attendance at religious services held in the House of Representa-
tives—including the service just two days after the letter—as evidence that the
President believed that the government “might serve as a passive, impartial
venue for voluntary religious activities.” Ibid., 789.
13. Robert M. O’Neill, “The ‘Wall’ of Separation,” and Thomas Jefferson’s Views
on Religious Liberty,” William & Mary Quarterly 56 (October 1999): 791, 793.
14. Thomas E. Buckley, “Reflections on a Wall,” William & Mary Quarterly 56
(October 1999): 795, 800.
15. Ibid.
16. Edwin Gaustad, “Thomas Jefferson, Danbury Baptists, and ‘Eternal Hosti-
lity,’” William & Mary Quarterly 56 (October 1999): 801, 804.
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latter decrying ideologically motivated efforts to “muzzle historical
research by a government archivist”17—before Isaac Kraminick and
R. Laurence Moore delivered the final opposing commentary.18
Ten years later the specific controversy over Hutson’s restorations
and commentary has died down,19 but the relationship between
constitutional historiography and constitutional principle—par-
ticularly in matters of church and state—remains problematic and
polarizing. In this regard, the debate over Hutson’s work provides
an excellent entry point into the following case study. This essay
explores the historiographical use of Jefferson’s letter—both in
Supreme Court doctrine and scholarly literature—in an attempt to
understand what made the 1998 restorations so controversial and
threatening, and as a means of exploring the sometimes corrosive
relationship between academic historiography and constitutional
law. The first section examines the Court’s opinions and locates Jef-
ferson’s metaphor at the center of an ongoing clash between what I
term “exclusive” and “inclusive” theories of state neutrality towards
religion; a debate that has set the stage for academic historical
inquiry along particular ideological lines.20 The second section
turns to the letter’s appearance in scholarship and, unsurprisingly,
finds both the “exclusive” and “inclusive” ideological approaches
vigorously, if not persuasively, defended.
I conclude that this constitutional dispute—and, in truth, many
others—admits no clear historical answer, and we must therefore
be willing to bring other interpretative tools to bear. Without such
flexibility there is a real danger that the relationship between consti-
tutional historiography and constitutional principle will become
increasingly incestuous as we preselect an ever-narrower field of
ideologized focal points for scholarship and adjudication.
Further, there is a larger point to be made about the different struc-
tures and goals of legal and historical argumentation. Legal argu-
ment is essentially binary—there is always a winning and a losing
side—and the lawyer and judge thus seek simplicity and finality.
Historical argument, on the other hand, aims largely to reveal
17. Daniel L. Dreisbach, “Thomas Jefferson and the Danbury Baptists
Revisited,” William & Mary Quarterly 56 (1999): 805, 814.
18. Isaac Kraminick and R. Laurence Moore, “The Baptists, the Bureau, and the
Case of the Missing Lines,” 56 William & Mary Quarterly 56 (1999): 817.
19. Although Hutson did edit a volume dedicated largely to a defense of his
thesis—featuring many of the same scholars—a few years later. See Religion
and the New Republic: Faith and the Founding of America, ed. James
H. Hutson (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
20. For a broader history of these two theories of state neutrality in the public
school context see, Ian Bartrum, “The Political Origins of Secular Public Schools:
The New York School Controversy 1840-42,” NYU Journal of Law & Liberty 3
(2008): 267.
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greater nuance, complexity, and depth; ultimately it seeks to expose
new and unanswered questions for future scholarship. These struc-
tures are in some ways fundamentally incompatible, and thus we
often distort one discipline to make it fit within the confines of
the other. Ironically, this sometimes means that “bad” historical
arguments lend themselves most easily to legal arguments.21 It is
this problematic relationship that I intend to expose and explore
here, and, in so doing, I hope to at least raise some important ques-
tions about the utility (or even possibility) of “originalism” as a
neutral interpretive principle.22
Jefferson’s Wall in the Supreme Court
Content from Jefferson’s letter first appeared in a Supreme Court
opinion in 1878, when a Mormon from the Utah territory challenged
his federal polygamy conviction on Free Exercise grounds.23 In Rey-
nolds v. United States, the Court acknowledged that the Constitution
offered no precise definition of either “religion” or “religious
freedom” and Chief Justice Morrison Waite thus decided to look
beyond the text “to the history of the times in the midst of which
the [First Amendment] was adopted.”24 After reviewing what are
now the canonical disestablishment texts—Jefferson’s Virginia
Statute Establishing Religious Freedom and James Madison’sMemor-
ial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments—Waite quoted
the entire central paragraph of the Danbury Baptist letter,25 whose
pedigree made it, he believed, “an authoritative declaration of the
21. I do not mean here to take a decisive position on “good” versus “bad”
history; eventually there are simply histories undertaken for different purposes.
I do mean to suggest, however, that legal–historical arguments tend to aim at
very different goals than purely historical arguments, and that the former are
thus more likely to be tailored to particular ideological outcomes. While any
human endeavor is inevitably grounded in individual experience, beliefs, and
understanding, we certainly have a shared conception of the term “biased”
(and thus some idea of what “unbiased” would be) and should, I believe, at
least intend our intellectual endeavors toward objectivity—no matter how
elusive that may ultimately be. In the end, however, even “good” or “objective”
historical arguments cannot, by their very nature as historical arguments, dis-
solve social normative disagreements in the way that some “originalists” seem
to believe.
22. For a revealing discussion of this view, see Clarence Thomas, “How to Read
the Constitution,” Wall Street Journal, Opinion, October 20, 2008, (“at least ori-
ginalism has the advantage of being legitimate and, I might add, impartial.”).
23. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) at 164. There were, of course,
very few cases addressing the religion clauses before 1940 because the First
Amendment applied only to federal, and not state, actions.
24. Ibid., 162.
25. The final text of that paragraph is as follows:
Historiography and Constitutional Principle
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scope and effect of the [First Amendment].”26 It was not the wall of
separation, however, but rather Jefferson’s distinction between
“actions” and “opinions” that interested Waite, who concluded
that the Constitution did not preclude statutory prohibition of
“acts” of polygamy.27
The Danbury letter resurfaced twenty years later in a Court of
Appeals decision upholding the federal incorporation of a Catholic
hospital in the District of Columbia.28 The appeals court again
reproduced the letter’s central paragraph and quoted Chief
Justice Waite’s opinion of its import, but then went on to offer its
own opinion on the meaning of the wall metaphor: “[T]he declara-
tion was intended to secure . . . complete religious liberty to all
persons, and the absolute separation of the Church from the
State, by the prohibition of any preference, by law, in favor of any
one religious persuasion or mode of worship.”29 This interpret-
ation—which has sometimes been termed a “nonpreferentialist”
reading30—corresponds to what I call an “inclusive” theory of
state neutrality, which holds that the state remains religiously
neutral by including all religious viewpoints equally. This construc-
tion remained largely undeveloped, however, as the federal courts
did not have occasion to contemplate Jefferson’s letter again for
many years; and by the time the Supreme Court did come back to
the wall of separation, the interpretive culture had changed
dramatically.
Believing with you that religion is amatter which lies solely between aman
and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship; that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and
not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should “make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.
Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf
of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the
progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his
natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his
social duties.
Danbury Letter quoted in ibid., 164 (underline in original, italics added).
26. Ibid., 164.
27. Ibid., 167.
28. Roberts v. Bradfield, 12 App.DC 453, 466 (1898). The Supreme Court would
eventually review, and uphold, this decision; but it did not invoke Jefferson’s
wall. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
29. Roberts, 12 App.DC at 467 (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Leonard Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First
Amendment (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 91.
Journal of Church and State
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By 1947, the Court had weathered the difficult early years of the
New Deal and emerged—after the critical “switch in time that
saved nine”31—with a profoundly enlarged conception of federal
authority. At the urging of Justice Hugo Black, it had begun to
“incorporate” the protections of the Bill of Rights into the substan-
tive liberties that the Fourteenth Amendment guards from state
encroachment. In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court took
the opportunity to incorporate the Establishment Clause while con-
sidering a New Jersey program that provided school busing to
Catholic school students.32 Writing for the majority, Justice Black
invoked Jefferson’s letter at the end of a paragraph that would
become a cornerstone of establishment doctrine:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess belief or disbelief in any religion. . . . In the words of Jeffer-
son, the clausewas intended to erect a “wall of separation between Church
and State.”33
The “strict separationist” interpretation Black offered in Everson is a
paradigmatic statement of what I call the “exclusive” theory of state
neutrality, which holds that the state remains religiously neutral
only by excluding all religious groups from state aid programs.
Somewhat surprisingly, the Everson majority upheld the New
Jersey busing program as providing merely an “incidental” benefit
to religion; a decision which provoked lengthy dissents from Jus-
tices Robert Jackson and Wiley Rutledge, the latter of whom pre-
ferred even stricter separation.34 Rutledge lamented that
“[n]either so high nor so impregnable today as yesterday is the
wall raised between church and state by . . . the First Amendment”
before offering the standard theoretical justification of exclusive
neutrality (and an explicit rebuke of inclusivism):
The problem . . . cannot be cast in terms of legal discrimination or its
absence. This would be true, even though the state in giving aid should
treat all religious instruction alike. Thus, if the present statute and its
31. The phrase is Thomas Reed Powell’s sardonic description of Justice Owen
Roberts’s doctrinal about face in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), which defused President Roosevelt’s court packing plan. See Owen
Fiss, The Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State: 1888-1910 (New York: Mac-
millan, 2006), 8 at n. 30.
32. Everson v. Bd. of Education of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) at 8.
33. Ibid., 15–16 (emphasis added).
34. Ibid., 17.
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application were shown to apply equally to all religious schools of what-
ever faith, yet in the light of our tradition it could not stand. . . . [I]t was
the furnishing of “contributions of money for the propagations of faith
which he disbelieves” that the fathers outlawed. That consequence and
effect are not removed by multiplying to all-inclusiveness the sects for
which support is exacted. The Constitution requires, not comprehensive
identification of state with religion, but complete separation.35
Just a year later the Everson dissenters would have their day in
McCollum v. Board of Education, a case which tested the constitu-
tionality of an Illinois program that brought private teachers into
public schools to conduct optional weekly religion classes.36McCol-
lum inspired two concurrences and a dissent by Justice Reed and
thus, perhaps more than any other case, it best outlines the con-
tours of the inclusive–exclusive debate and its relationship to Jef-
ferson’s figurative wall. Writing for the majority, Justice Black
recited the foundational paragraph from Everson quoted above,
adding by way of explanation that “the First Amendment rests
upon the premise that both religion and government can best
work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other
within its respective sphere.”37 He concluded with a rhetorical
return to Jefferson—the “wall between Church and State . . . must
be kept high and impregnable”—and then struck down the Illinois
program in a flurry of exclusivist rhetoric.38
Black’s short opinion was not enough for the Everson dissenters,
however. These justices concurred inMcCollum and sought to vindi-
cate the strict separationism that had failed to carry the Court a year
earlier. Justice Felix Frankfurter began his defense of exclusivism by
suggesting that the Constitution must prohibit more than just the
establishment of an official state church, and he proceeded to
flesh out Jefferson’s metaphor:
We are all agreed that the First and Fourteenth Amendments have a
secular reach far more penetrating in the conduct of Government than
merely to forbid an “established church.” But agreement, in the abstract,
that the First Amendment was designed to erect a “wall of separation
between Church and State,” does not preclude a clash of views as to
35. Ibid., 52, 59–60 (Rutledge, J., concurring). In contrast, the inclusivist con-
tends that exclusion preferences a secular or nonreligious worldview, which is
far from neutral on metaphysical questions.
36. McCollum v. Bd. of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). The program brought in
privately funded instructors to teach Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish classes
one day a week to the children of requesting parents. Students who elected
not to participate received secular instruction in another classroom. Ibid.,
207–09.
37. Ibid., 212.
38. Ibid.
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what the wall separates. . . . We cannot illuminatingly apply the “wall of
separation” metaphor until we have considered the relevant history of
religious education in America.39
And the dubious history Frankfurter then presented—centered on
the supposed battle to secularize public education against “fierce
sectarian opposition”40—made clear that exclusive neutrality was
the only acceptable solution, as did his concluding words: “Separ-
ation means separation, not something less. Jefferson’s metaphor
in describing the relation between Church and State speaks of a
‘wall of separation,’ not a fine line easily overstepped. It is the
Court’s duty to enforce this principle in its full integrity.”41
Justice Jackson, however, did not find the metaphoric wall so easy
to discern or apply, and he expressed doubts about the simplistic
brand of exclusivism Frankfurter’s historicized appeal to Jefferson
seemed to imply:
It is idle to pretend that this task is one for which we can find in the Con-
stitution one word to help us as judges to decide where the secular ends
and the sectarian begins in education. Nor can we find guidance in any
other legal source. It is a matter on which we find no law but our own pre-
possessions. If with no surer legal guidance we are to take up and decide
every variation of this controversy . . . we are likely to make the legal “wall
of separation between Church and State” as winding as the famous ser-
pentine wall designed by Mr. Jefferson for the University he founded.42
Justice Stanley Reed, the lone dissenter, articulated even greater
reservations about the exclusivist position and, in particular, its
grounding in Jefferson’s Danbury letter: “A reading of the general
statements of eminent statesmen of former days . . . will show
that circumstances such as those in this case were far from the
minds of the authors. The words and spirit of those statements
may be wholeheartedly accepted without in the least impugning
[the Illinois program].”43 Reed went on to present a different histori-
cal account; using other Jefferson writings he demonstrated that
Jefferson envisaged a significant role for religion in the classrooms
of the University of Virginia.44 “Thus,” he concluded:
39. Ibid., 213 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
40. Ibid., 214. This battle was actually an effort to exclude Catholic teaching
from what were universally acknowledged to be Protestant public schools—in
which the King James Bible and Book of Common Prayer were central texts.
See Bartrum, “The Political Origins,” 286–313.
41. Ibid., 231. It is perhaps ironic that Frankfurter finished by reciting a line
from the Robert Frost poem quoted at this paper’s head—”good fences make
good neighbors.” Frost, of course, meant to express a contrary sentiment.
42. Ibid., 237–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
43. Ibid., 244 (Reed, J., dissenting).
Historiography and Constitutional Principle
111
 a
t U
N
L
V
 U
n
iv
e
rs
ity
 L
ib
ra
rie
s
 o
n
 J
u
ly
 2
5
, 2
0
1
1
jc
s
.o
x
fo
rd
jo
u
rn
a
ls
.o
rg
D
o
w
n
lo
a
d
e
d
 fro
m
 
the “wall of separation between Church and State” that Mr. Jefferson built
at the University which he founded did not exclude religious education
from that school. The difference between the generality of his statements
on the separation of church and state and the specificity of his con-
clusions on education are considerable. A rule of law should not be
drawn from a figure of speech.45
But Reed’s inclusivist instincts ran against the generally exclusivist
tide of the day (with the notable exceptions discussed below), and
over the next forty years Jefferson’s wall became the rhetorical cen-
terpiece of the exclusive neutrality doctrine. During that time, the
Danbury letter made an appearance in exclusivist majority opinions
that struck down school prayer,46 moments of silence,47 nonsectar-
ian graduation prayers,48 public funding for Catholic school field
trips,49 a church’s veto power over neighboring liquor licenses,50
and tax benefits to parochial school parents51—and in exclusivist
dissents against decisions that upheld the loan of textbooks to
Catholic schools,52 prayer at the opening of a state legislature,53
and a private party’s display of a cross on state capitol grounds.54
Exclusive neutrality never entirely controlled the interpretive
field, however—even in the mid-twentieth century—and in recent
years inclusivism has found increasing support on the Court. In
fact, the Court issued its seminal inclusivist decision in 1952, just
a few years after McCollum. In Zorach v. Clauson, five justices
upheld a New York City “released time” program that permitted
the children of requesting parents to leave school to receive
weekly instruction at private religious centers.55 Writing for the
majority, Justice William Douglas acknowledged the impressive
44. Ibid., 245–48.
45. Ibid., 247.
46. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) at 426.
47. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
48. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
49. Wolman v. Walter, 423 U.S. 229 (1977) at 235.
50. Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982) at 123.
51. Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) at 761.
52. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (Black, J., dissenting) at 251.
53. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) at 802 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Brennan outlined four purposes of the exclusive neutrality doctrine: (1) to
prevent compelled support for another religion; (2) to prevent state interference
with religious autonomy; (3) to protect religion from the degradation of state
association; and (4) to prevent political divisiveness. Ibid., 803–06.
54. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) at 797
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) at 308. The challenged program was
similar to the one struck down in McCollum, except in Zorach the religious
instruction did not occur in the public school building.
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shadow of Jefferson’s wall, but began to pick at a few cracks in the
mortar: “The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every
and all respects there shall be a separation of church and state. . . .
This is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise the Church and
State would be aliens to each other—hostile, suspicious, and even
unfriendly.”56 He then gave what has become the paradigmatic jus-
tification of inclusive neutrality:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.
We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for
as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem
necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of the government that
shows no partiality to any group and that lets each flourish according
to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state
encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities
by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows
the best of our traditions. For then it respects the religious nature of
our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a
requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious
groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe.57
Douglas’s vision was a powerful challenge to the exclusionary
imagery of the wall of separation—was it really Jefferson’s desire
to banish all religion from government, or is it more likely that he
objected to state preference of one religion over another? Was
the wall to be erected between the state and religion or between
the state and sectarianism? For Douglas and other inclusivists, the
logic of exclusive neutrality was internally contradictory: exclusi-
vism could not claim to be truly neutral while forthrightly promot-
ing a secular worldview.
While it did not often command a majority of the Court, the inclus-
ive theory of neutrality simmered just below the surface over the next
several decades. Justice Potter Stewart kept it alive in two scathing
dissents in the school prayer decisions of the 1960s. In the second
case, Abington School District v. Schempp, he offered a cogent
summary of the inclusivist objection in the school prayer context:
[A] compulsory state educational system so structures a child’s life that if
religious exercises are held to be an impermissible activity in schools, reli-
gion is placed at an artificial and state-created disadvantage. . . . [The]
refusal to permit religious exercises thus is seen, not as the realization
of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a religion of
secularism.58
56. Ibid., 312.
57. Ibid., 313.
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And, beginning the mid-1980s, inclusivists began to mount a more
direct attack on the language of the Danbury letter. Writing for the
majority in Lynch v. Donnelly—a decision upholding a nativity
scene on city property—Chief Justice Warren Burger offered the fol-
lowing thoughts: “The concept of a ‘wall’ of separation is a useful
figure of speech probably deriving from the views of Thomas
Jefferson. . . . But the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate
description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact
exists between church and state.”59 He then reached a straightfor-
ward inclusivist conclusion: “the Constitution [does not] require
complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids
hostility towards any.”60
Soon-to-be-Chief Justice William Rehnquist continued the inclusi-
vist attack on Jefferson’s wall in dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, a case
in which the majority struck down moments of silence at public
schools. From the outset, he peevishly chided the Court for its mis-
placed reliance on the Danbury letter:
It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken
understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establish-
ment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson’s misleading
metaphor for nearly forty years. Thomas Jefferson was of course in
France at the time the constitutional amendments known as the Bill of
Rights were passed by Congress and ratified by the States. His letter to
the Danbury Baptist Association was a short note of courtesy, written
fourteen years after the amendments were passed by Congress. He
would seem to any detached observer as a less than ideal source of con-
temporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment.61
After doing his own bit of historicizing—focused selectively on
some of James Madison’s writings and contemporary dictionary
definitions of “establishment”—Rehnquist struck a decidedly
inclusivist chord: “The Establishment Clause did not require gov-
ernment neutrality between religion and nonreligion nor did it
prohibit the Federal Government from providing nondiscrimina-
tory aid to religion. There is simply no historical foundation for
the . . . ‘wall of separation’ that was constitutionalized in
Everson.”62
58. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 US. 203 (1963) at 313 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
59. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1983) at 673.
60. Ibid. (emphasis added).
61. Wallace, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. Ibid., 106.
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By the turn of the century the Court’s ideological composition had
shifted towards Rehnquist, and inclusivism began to seek new pas-
sages through the wall. In Mitchell v. Helms, the Court upheld a
Louisiana program that provided educational materials to religious
and secular schools on an equal basis—despite a sharp dissent
quoting the seminal exclusivist language from Everson.63 In Good
News Club v. Milford Central School, the Court required a
New York school that opened its facilities to community groups
after hours to include religious groups on an equal basis.64 Justice
Clarence Thomas’s majority opinion recast the issue in terms of
free speech, but he enthusiastically endorsed an inclusive con-
ception of religious neutrality: “Because allowing [religious
groups] to speak on school grounds would ensure neutrality, not
threaten it, Milford faces an uphill battle in arguing that the Estab-
lishment Clause compels it to exclude [these groups].”65 As a
result of this change on the Court—part of which is a calculated
shift towards free speech analysis66—exclusivists have found them-
selves increasingly on the defensive. So much so that in 2005, in the
case Van Orden v. Perry that upheld a monument of the Ten Com-
mandments on the Texas state capitol grounds, dissenting Justice
John Paul Stevens was left stridently guarding the remnants of a
weatherworn exclusivism: “If any fragment of Jefferson’s metapho-
rical ‘wall of separation between church and State’ is to be
preserved—if there remains any meaning to the wholesome ‘neu-
trality’ of which this Court’s Establishment Clause cases speak—
[the Texas display must come down].”67
Over the last sixty years, then, Jefferson’s wall of separation has
occupied a place of prominence in the ongoing debate over how
best to ensure state neutrality in religious matters. The metaphor
has become a powerful rhetorical showpiece for advocates of an
exclusive theory of neutrality, and, as an enduring image of estab-
lished secularism, it has been the target of prolonged attacks from
inclusivists. It is thus little wonder that James Hutson’s restoration
and commentary on Jefferson’s original draft provoked such sharp
scholarly disagreement in 1998; after all, this is a field in which
disputed historical meanings can have real and profound
modern consequences. As an easily accessible symbol, Jefferson’s
metaphor has provided a convenient, if overly simplistic, focal
63. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (1999) at 873 (Souter, J., dissenting).
64. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) at 102.
65. Ibid., 114.
66. See Ian Bartrum, “Paradise Lost:Good News Club, Charitable Choice, and the
State of Religious Freedom,” Vermont Law Review 27 (2002): 177.
67. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) at 708 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
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point for law office historians. But the story is not much better for
academic historians. As might be expected, scholars have debated
Jefferson’s letter with remarkable prolixity since its constitutional
canonization in Everson. And, as evidenced below, many pro-
fessional historians have found some way or another to throw
their learned weight entirely behind one side of the Supreme
Court’s internal debate or the other—a circumstance that cannot
help but raise the skeptical scholar’s eyebrow.
Jefferson’s Wall in Historical Scholarship
I have implied that the academy’s interest in Jefferson’s Danbury
letter is largely a reaction to the Supreme Court’s rhetorical use of
the metaphorical wall of separation. In what follows I flesh out
this claim as I track the letter’s appearance in six scholarly
books, though it certainly has turned up in many more. I have
chosen these books because they are among the most widely
read and respected texts in the field, and because I believe they
illustrate that academic historiography has generally adopted,
and thus perpetuated, the exclusive–inclusive structure that the
Court has framed. It is this intersection of political ideologies
and historiographical agendas that I hope to emphasize and
examine. I have chosen to limit my focus to books that appeared
after Everson and before the 1998 restoration controversy, though
I will have a little to say about more recent scholarship in
concluding.
The first book is Leo Pfeffer’s influential Church, State, and
Freedom, first published in 1953.68 Before entering academia,
Pfeffer was a distinguished attorney who appeared frequently
before the Supreme Court, and his antagonistic literary style
recalls his courtroom experience. He begins by summarizing the
western traditions regarding law and religion before turning in
earnest to the colonial American innovations, which he argues
were intended, from the outset, to set up an exclusivist neutrality
that “barred nonpreferential aid to religion [because] such aid con-
stituted an establishment of religion.”69 Along the way, he vigor-
ously defends the Court’s use of the Danbury letter against
“valiant attempts” tominimize its importance—which he uncharita-
bly dismisses as “facile disposals” and “historically inaccurate.”70
Pfeffer offers a spirited and tightly argued defense of the exclusivist
position that the Court adopted in Everson and McCollum, to which
68. Leo Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1953).
69. Ibid., 161 (internal quotations omitted).
70. Ibid., 133, 134.
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he repeatedly refers. He is deeply troubled by the then-recent
Zorach decision, which he characterizes as the result of an
ill-informed and destructive “four-year verbal barrage” against Jef-
ferson’s letter.71 Thus, the heart of the book is a detailed, if not ter-
ribly persuasive, historical argument against the inclusivist (or
nonpreferentialist) threat that Zorach presented, and as such
Pfeffer seems to have inaugurated a tradition of disestablishment
history consciously tailored to the defense of a particular consti-
tutional theory.
It was more than a decade later—soon after the school prayer
decisions—that Mark DeWolfe Howe published his widely acclaimed
The Garden and the Wilderness, which offers an elegant and
nuanced counterweight to Pfeffer’s book.72 Howe laments what he
perceives as a growing gap between social reality and constitutional
principle on church and state issues; a gap he blames primarily on
the Court’s “superficial and purposive” efforts to prove that “the
only theory of separation known in constitutional history is
Jeffersonian or rationalistic.”73 As an alternative, Howe posits an
“evangelical” disestablishment, which he traces back to the source
from which Jefferson borrowed his famous wall metaphor: Roger
Williams.74 Williams’s wall of separation appeared in a 1644
meditation on the separation of the earthly from the divine:
[W]hen [the Christians] have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separ-
ation between the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world,
God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the Candlestick, etc.,
and made His Garden a wilderness as it is this day. And that therefore if
He will ever please to restore His garden and Paradise again, it must of
necessity be walled in peculiarly unto Himself from the world, and all
that be saved out of the world are to be transplanted out of the wilderness
of the World.75
Howe sees in Williams’s wall a “theological” effort to protect the
church from “the dread of worldly corruptions,” while he character-
izes Jefferson’s wall as a “political” protection of individual liber-
ties.76 He argues that the Court has wrongly chosen to enforce
Jefferson’s exclusionary wall to the detriment of Williams’s
71. Ibid., 135.
72. Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Govern-
ment in American Constitutional History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1965).
73. Ibid., 11.
74. Ibid., 5–7.
75. Roger Williams, “Mr. Cotton’s Letter Lately Printed, Examined and
Answered” (1644), reprinted in The Complete Writings of Roger Williams 1, ed.
Perry Miller (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963), 108.
76. Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness, 6–7.
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evangelical division. Moreover, Howe suggests that exclusive neu-
trality is hostile to the rich “de facto establishment” of religion
that characterizes American life, whose advancement is “among
the most important purposes of the First Amendment.”77 Given
these misgivings, Howe concludes that the Court’s then-recent
approach “may be admirable law, but it is . . . distorted history.”78
Howe’s valuable response is to demand that the Court consider an
additional strand of historical meaning—the evangelical strand—
in constructing its narrative; but in this effort he ultimately
presses too far and seems to suggest that we must emphasize the
evangelical wall to the expense of the rational conception. The
final result is a historical argument that, while more sophisticated
and less transparently political then Pfeiffer’s, still seems tied to a
particular constitutional ideology; one that deeply regrets the exclu-
sivist decisions handed down just a few years before.
The Reagan appointments, and particularly Justice Rehnquist’s
historically grounded dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, sparked a
renewed wave of scholarly interest in First Amendment history in
themid-1980s.79 In 1986, Leonard LevypublishedThe Establishment
Clause, which quickly became a leading text in the field.80 To many
readers, Levy’s argument comes across as a direct and unapologetic
attackon inclusivism. Ina telling, thoughsympathetic, review,Robert
Michaelsan characterizes the book as a “thoroughly researched
defense of Mr. Jefferson’s ‘wall of separation’ . . . aimed primarily
at ‘nonpreferentialists’ like Chief Justice Rehnquist.”81 Indeed,
Levy aggressively challenges competing accounts of the Danbury
letter:
The usual interpretation of Jefferson’s Danbury Baptist letter by those
who seek to weaken its force is either to minimize it or to argue that he
77. Ibid., 31.
78. Ibid.
79. In addition to the works discussed herein, see, e.g., Michael W. McConnell,
“The Origins and Historical Understanding of the Free Exercise of Religion,”
Harvard Law Review 103 (1990): 1409; Robert T. Handy, “Why It Took 150
Years for the Supreme Court Church-State Cases to Escalate,” Princeton Semin-
ary Bulletin 9 (1988): 32; Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State
in America to the Passage of the First Amendment (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986); William L. Miller, The First Liberty: Religion and the American
Republic (New York: Paragon, 1986); James A. Reichley, Religion In American
Public Life (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985); Thomas E. Buckley,
“Church and State in Massachusetts Bay: The Case of the Baptist Dissenters,”
Journal of Church and State 23 (1981): 309; Leo Pfeffer, “The Deity in American
Constitutional History,” Journal of Church and State 23 (1981): 215.
80. Levy, The Establishment Clause.
81. Robert S. Michaelsen, book review, “The Establishment Clause: Religion and
the First Amendment,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 59 (1991):
843.
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was here concerned only with the rights of conscience, and that these
would “never be endangered by treating all religions equally in regard to
support” by the government. Neither interpretation is valid.82
To counter the first contention, Levy points to the history of careful
consultation and drafting that Hutson would revisit in 1998.83
Against the second objection he offers the standard exclusivist
justification—Jefferson’s unwillingness to compel a taxpayer to
contribute to an alien faith—and curtly concludes, “Jefferson
most assuredly did believe that government support of all religions
violated the rights of conscience.”84 So dismayed is Levy with the
prospect of an inclusive neutrality that he devotes an entire
chapter to discrediting the views of “the nonpreferentialists” as “a
plausible but fundamentally defective interpretation of the estab-
lishment clause.”85 In it he decries Attorney General Edwin Meese
and, particularly Chief Justice Rehnquist (he “wrote fiction and
passed it off as history”), for advancing a theory at odds with
Levy’s own reading of the record.86 Again, however, the lingering
impression is one of constitutional historiography rather than
exhaustive historical scholarship; or, perhaps more charitably,
Levy’s seems to be scholarship undertaken in the service of a par-
ticular constitutional approach.
Daniel Dreisbach took the title of his 1987 book, Real Threat and
Mere Shadow, from a line in Justice Arthur Goldberg’s brooding and
reluctant concurrence in Abington School District v. Schempp, which
Chief Justice Warren Burger incorporated into his thoughtful
dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree.87 Thus, it is probably unsurprising
that the book is largely an inclusivist parry to Levy’s exclusivist
82. Levy, The Establishment Clause, 182 (quoting J.M. O’Neill, Religion and Edu-
cation Under the Constitution [New York: Harper, 1949]), 81.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., 91.
86. In truth, there are real problems with Levy’s own arguments in favor of
exclusivism. His account is based largely on abandoned earlier versions of the
Establishment Clause—which has a post hoc, ergo propter hoc quality to it—
and on his contention that inclusivism “leads us to the impossible conclusion
that the First Amendment added to Congress’s power.” Ibid., 84. This second
contention relies on Levy’s earlier demonstration that the amendment left the
subject of religion “exclusively to the states”; but to suggest that the federalism
aspects of the amendment somehow speak to the nature of scope of “establish-
ment” (again, and issue left to the states) is simply a category maistake. Ibid., 74.
87. Daniel Dreisbach, Real Threat and Mere Shadow: Religious Liberty and the
First Amendment (Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 1987). Goldberg reminded
his more enthusiastically exclusivist colleagues that, “the measure of [sound]
constitutional adjudication is the ability and willingness to distinguish
between real threat and mere shadow.” Schempp, 374 U.S. at 308 (Goldberg,
J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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thrust. Rather than focus narrowly on Jefferson’s Statute Establish-
ing Religious Freedom and Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance,
Dreisbach emphasizes the willingness on both parts to support leg-
islative chaplains and national days of prayer—as well as federal
Indian missionaries—as evidence that “many of the founding
fathers, including Jefferson and Madison, did not interpret the No
Establishment clause to prohibit federal assistance to religion as
long as it did not discriminate in favor of one religious group
against another.”88 In addressing the wall of separation more
specifically, Dreisbach takes a decidedly “jurisdictional” or federal-
ist tack: “[A] careful reading of the Danbury letter reveals that Jeffer-
son was not addressing the broader issue of church and civil
government . . . rather he was examining the narrower issue of
whether a separation between the entire federal government and
religion was required by the framers of the First Amendment.”89
This interpretation allows Dreisbach to conclude that exclusivist
decisions like Everson had “misplace[d] the wall,” which should be
seen as existing “between the federal government and the
states.”90 While Dreisbach perhaps offers a persuasive reason not
to treat Jefferson’s metaphor as a broad statement of constitutional
principle, he does little to support an inclusivist reading of Jeffer-
son’s larger First Amendment ideas. Indeed, his inconsistent treat-
ment of Madison and Jefferson—on the one hand he discounts
them as “decidedly more radical”91 than their contemporaries,
while on the other he holds them up as worthy champions of inclu-
sivism92—tends to expose his modern constitutional motivations.
Gerard Bradley’s 1987 book Church-State Relationships in
America picks up right where Dreisbach left off.93 Like Dreisbach,
Bradley is a passionate inclusivist, and his book presents a scathing
attack on the Court’s exclusivist opinions, particularly Everson and
McCollum.94 His disgust with those decisions is palpable, particu-
larly regarding their use of history:
Given the critical role of church-state issues in U.S. political life . . . it is
tragic that a more unfortunate historical analysis than Everson’s would
be hard to find. The problem is not only that the justices there recover
88. Dreisbach, Real Threat and Mere Shadow, 75.
89. Ibid., 126.
90. Ibid., 126–27.
91. Ibid., 104.
92. Ibid., 75.
93. Gerard V. Bradley, Church-State Relationships in America (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1987).
94. Ibid., 1–15. Bradley correctly points out the “fatal misstep” in Justice
Frankfurter’sMcCollum history, which was, as I have said above, to “equate non-
sectarian with nonreligious.” Ibid., 10.
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inaccurate historical answers (although they do much of that), but that
they ask the wrong questions.95
For Bradley, the problem is not so much that the Court misinter-
preted sources like the Danbury letter (although he thinks it did),
but rather that it misused them. Even if Madison and Jefferson
did hold exclusivist beliefs about religion and government, their
beliefs—as individuals—are not an appropriate foundation for
constitutional meaning. “Not a word of the state-by-state
ratification process is spoken in Everson,” he laments. “In fact,
one would think from the opinions that the First Amendment was
rendered operative by House approval, if not by the simple act of
Madison’s penmanship.”96 Bradley’s persistent protestations in
favor of inclusivism are too strident and simplistic to be persuasive,
however, and as a result his book inspires less confidence in author-
ial objectivity than any of those yet examined. Perhaps we can
forgive Bradley his transparent advocacy—he is the lone law pro-
fessor discussed—but his method and approach stand out as a
remarkable example of the kind of ideologically driven history
that disputed constitutional principles seem to inspire.
Finally, and perhaps refreshingly, we turn to Edwin Gaustad’s
Faith of Our Fathers, which is an understated and impressive
book on the religious mind of the founding generation.97 Less forth-
rightly ideological than any of theworks discussed above, Gaustad’s
1998 book is a generally thoughtful and fair-minded account of
the religious lives of iconic figures such as Adams, Washington,
Franklin, Jefferson, and Madison. While he concedes some of the
federalist ground Dreisbach had claimed—acknowledging that, to
most members of the constitutional convention, “religion seemed
. . . a matter best left to the states”98—he maintains that the
Danbury letter decisively supports an exclusivist theory of
neutrality:
Unconsciously echoing the language of Roger Williams, Jefferson found in
the religion phrases of the First Amendment no vague or fuzzy language
to be bent or shaped or twisted as suited any Supreme Court justice or
White House incumbent. The amendment had built a wall, with the eccle-
siastical estate on one side and the civil estate on the other. Jefferson first
employed the metaphor, then endeavored the rest of his life to give that
metaphor as much brick and mortar as he possibly could.99
95. Ibid., 12.
96. Ibid.
97. Edwin S. Gaustad, Faith of Our Fathers: Religion and the New Nation
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988).
98. Ibid., 43.
99. Ibid., 46.
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Employing a number of personal letters and memoranda from
the period during which Jefferson founded the University of
Virginia, Gaustad persuasively portrayed Jefferson as—for the
most part—an ideological exclusivist; but his effort to link Jeffer-
son’s thought to the broader meaning of the First Amendment is
less compelling.100 Nonetheless, Gaustad’s account seems a fair
and honest one; and his balanced depiction of the conflicting and
complex disestablishment ideas prevalent in the 1780s provides a
revealing backdrop against which to discern the contours of other
more ideologically motivated work. Perhaps Gaustad’s most
astute observation, however, is that unlike the larger body of found-
ing thought on church and state, which is complex and often contra-
dictory, Jefferson’s letter provides a perhaps too convenient talking
point for courts and historians looking for simple historical
answers to increasingly complicated political problems.101 And
thus Gaustad subtly—and rightly—recalls Justice Reed’s admoni-
tion in McCollum: “A rule of law should not be drawn from a
figure of speech.”102
Conclusion
In the years following the Hutson restoration controversy, a number
of more nuanced and less ideological histories of the Establishment
Clause have emerged; among them are particularly excellent books
by Akhil Reed Amar, Philip Hamburger, and John Noonan.103 The
general tenor of scholarly discourse on the issue remains polemic
and strained, however, particularly as a sea change appears immi-
nent on the Supreme Court. Indeed, it has become difficult to
address the history of the religion clauses in any substantive way
without becoming inadvertently aligned with one or another side
of the controversy. I suggest that this unfortunate circumstance is
at least partly a result of the complicated and corrosive influence
of constitutional law and policy on historical scholarship. It is
perhaps too tempting to engage in policy-driven historiography
100. Ibid., 47–50. Gaustad concedes, for example, that the state constitutions
“[r]ang with religious language” and “did not accept religious neutrality or indif-
ference as a necessary consequence [of the First Amendment].” Ibid., 114.
101. See ibid., 137 (“[A]s the nation became increasingly pluralistic if not
secular, the courts (both state and federal) found Jefferson and Madison
increasingly useful.”).
102. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 247 (Reed, J., dissenting).
103. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church
and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); John Thomas
Noonan, The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of Religious
Freedom (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998).
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when the results can have a profound impact on current legal prac-
tices. After all, while most historical debates resonate only within a
small circle of participants and scholars, constitutional history can
initiate broad and important social change. Even for historians,
then, power can corrupt.
This political seduction is made all the more problematic by the
polarizing and adversarial nature of constitutional adjudication,
which does not respond well to the complexity and subtlety of aca-
demic history. Rather, the system encourages an equally simplistic
historiography; one tailored neatly to the doctrinal framework the
Court has constructed. The result is the binary kind of analysis dis-
cussed above, with historians lining up eagerly on either side of a
judicially imposed dividing line. After all, scholarship that squarely
supports one side of the debate could turn up in a constitutional
opinion, while more sophisticated studies rendered in delicate
shades rarely have an impact on national policy. Thus, the scholar
tempted by the constitutional spotlight not only must pick a side,
she must also simplify her account for easy judicial access.
But this is a two-way street, and the incestuous relationship
between historiography and constitutional law is as destructive of
principled jurisprudence as it is of historical scholarship. As long
as the Supreme Court gives exaggerated importance to consti-
tutional history—as long as powerful judges continue to suggest
that “original intentions” actually compel particular results—
constitutional meaning will remain a contingent prisoner of diver-
gent ideological histories. In two excellent books, Philip Bobbitt
has advanced a theoretical conception of constitutional law that
posits six legitimate modalities of argument: historical, textual,
structural, doctrinal, prudential, and ethical.104 The lesson of Bob-
bitt’s work is that no foundational piece of history (or text, or doc-
trine) can reveal clean and uncontroversial constitutional meanings
in these kinds of cases; there are only competing and equally legit-
imate ways of talking about constitutional principle. The more mod-
alities that we can bring to bear on a constitutional question, the
richer and more rewarding our answers are likely to be. Conversely,
the more that we imagine that history provides the only definitive
solutions to our constitutional problems, the more inbred and
unstable our law—and our history—become.
This is particularly true of the inclusive–exclusive neutrality
debate. As we have seen, there is historical support for either
view, and—to make matters even more difficult—each position is
104. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1982); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation
(Cambridge: B. Blackwell, 1991).
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also vulnerable to debilitating objections. The exclusivists rightly
point out that equal public support for all religions necessarily
compels individual citizens to provide tax support for institutions
and beliefs that they may find blasphemous—which certainly con-
flicts with at least some founding conceptions of religious
freedom. Inclusivists, however, respond with the charge that exclu-
sivism necessarily aligns the state with a secular or nonreligious
viewpoint; and this too is both true and contrary to founding
ideas about the place of religion in a self-governing society. Thus
sound-bite history—or evenmore sophisticated history, as an exclu-
sive resource—cannot provide a satisfying solution for this
dilemma; indeed, the founders themselves often straddled the
inclusivist–exclusivist divide. Rather, this problem requires us to
engage multiple modes of argument and inquiry, asking us to
bring all of our constitutional problem solving skills to the table
in the hope of reaching juridical conclusions consistent with both
our best traditions and the realities of modern American life. Else-
where, I have urged the value of taking a structural approach to
some of these questions,105 but—whatever the right answers
are—I think it is evident that history alone cannot provide them.106
The broader lesson of the Danbury case study, I suggest, is that
historical and legal argument are fundamentally different crea-
tures. Where history aims at increasing complexity, depth, and
scope; law seeks simplicity, clarity, and resolution. Thus, consti-
tutional history—while an important and necessary part of consti-
tutional interpretation—is necessarily a limited and qualified
interpretative resource. The reality is that too much reliance on
the historical modality—no matter how well intended—tends to
simplify both the law and the discipline beyond recognizable
utility. The lesson thus reflected in Jefferson’s winding wall, I
suggest, is that, if we are not careful, we will see in it only what
we want to, and this is of little help in revealing neutral
105. Ian Bartrum, “The Constitutional Structure of Disestablishment,” NYU
Journal of Law & Liberty 2 (2007): 311.
106. I have thus far tried to avoid injecting my own views on the merits of the
historical debate into this discussion, but I cannot avoid pointing out (even if
only in a footnote) that the best evidence seems to suggest that the founders’
views on the Establishment Clause are not terribly relevant to the modern dis-
cussion. When written, the Clause—at the very least—did not apply to the
states; and it seems plausible that it was intended to further prevent federal
interference with state religious establishments. See, e.g., Amar, The Bill of
Rights, 32–45. The modern conception of disestablishment is thus best
reflected in the adoption of the Fourteenth, not the First, Amendment. See
ibid. Accordingly, efforts to link Jefferson’s letter with the modern meaning
of the Establishment Clause are ultimately looking under the wrong historical
lamppost.
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constitutional principle. And, as this interpretive danger seems
unlikely to dissipate anytime soon, a mature and productive
approach to the problematic relationship between historiography
and constitutional principle must understand the interaction of
scholar (or judge) and subject as a complex and imperfect human
practice. Rather than press for simplistic, theory-friendly answers,
we must recognize that the practice and its accompanying political
institutions are best served by open, authentic, and fair-minded
scholarship and jurisprudence—complete with the inconvenience,
intricacies and contradictions that such genuine intellectual endea-
vors inevitably entail. In so doing, we must also acknowledge that
history is not the neutral and decisive constitutional panacea we
sometimes pretend it to be.
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